Ksawatsالنسخة العربية

Dr. Ismail Ibrahim: Beyond the Crises... A Different Reading of Building Economic Power

18 November 2026 ·

Dr. Ismail Ibrahim: Beyond the Crises... A Different Reading of Building Economic Power
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Dr. Ismail Ibrahim argues that crises test decisions made years earlier, and that wise management handles prosperity in a way that preserves the capacity for resilience and building after hardship, citing the example of Prophet Yusuf's (Joseph's) stewardship. He presents Saudi Arabia's experience in the current crisis as a model of this, from the East-West pipeline and defense and industrial partnerships to oil supply m…

In this article, Dr. Ismail Ibrahim, a commentator on economic affairs, offers a reading of how crises can be turned into sources of economic power, from the stewardship of Prophet Yusuf (peace be upon him) to Saudi Arabia's experience in the current crisis. He writes:

In my view, one of the most common mistakes made by managements, whether at the level of companies or national economies, is that they begin talking about crisis management only when the crisis actually strikes, as if strategic management begins the moment markets freeze or resources and operations come under exceptional pressure. In reality, what happens during crises is merely a test of decisions taken years earlier, of resources that were built up or depleted, and of institutional systems built on preparedness and flexibility or on the assumption that stability would continue. That is why I do not believe the most important question is how states and companies survive crises, but rather how periods of prosperity are managed so that abundance does not become a source of weakness, how periods of hardship are managed so that preserving the present does not come at the expense of the future, and how the changes a crisis imposes can be turned into economic advantages that endure after it ends. There is a fundamental difference between an economy that can absorb a shock and one that can reshape its competitive position afterward, and between a management that succeeds in minimizing losses and a leadership that invests in the crisis to rebuild its sources of strength.

Perhaps one of the deepest foundations for understanding this logic is what appears in Surah Yusuf, when the stewardship of Prophet Yusuf (peace be upon him) was not limited to interpreting the dream or warning of the years of famine, but rather presented a comprehensive economic vision extending from the years of abundance to the years of hardship and beyond. Allah Almighty said: "He said: You will sow for seven years as usual; so leave in the ear whatever you harvest, except a little of what you eat." Then He said: "Then after that will come seven hard years that will consume what you have stored for them, except a little of what you have kept in reserve," leading up to His saying: "Then after that will come a year in which the people will be given relief, and in which they will press (fruit)." Contemplating this stewardship, one finds something deeper than the idea of saving for the future: organizing production during years of plenty, regulating consumption, and preserving resources in a manner that safeguards their value, then managing the years of hardship while retaining part of the essentials needed to sustain life and production, until a stage when abundance and economic activity return. In these meanings I see an important foundation for the philosophy of strategic management: not to consume everything we produce when resources are available, not to consume all of our future when they tighten, and not to make the goal of management merely surviving the crisis, but rather preserving the ability to build afterward.

Moving from this meaning to contemporary economic management, we find that institutions are often rewarded during periods of growth for rising profits, rapid expansion, and capital efficiency, while some elements of strategic readiness do not receive the same weight, because they may appear on financial statements as costs or underutilized resources. Buffer inventories may reduce working capital efficiency, supplier diversification may raise procurement costs, retaining alternative operating capacity may reduce margins, and not exhausting borrowing capacity may look like a missed investment opportunity. But this view, while understandable from a short-term financial efficiency perspective, falls short if it ignores the economic value of the ability to endure when conditions change. A good strategy does not seek the highest possible efficiency in a single economic scenario, but rather a balance between efficiency and the ability to adapt to different conditions. A resource that may seem surplus in times of prosperity may be precisely what gives an institution freedom of decision in times of crisis, while some short-term savings can turn into larger losses when a single supply chain is disrupted or a major source of financing dries up.

When I look at what the region is experiencing during the current crisis, I find that the Saudi experience offers a model worth studying from a strategic management perspective—not because the Kingdom is immune to the effects of the conflict and economic turmoil, but because many elements of its ability to handle these circumstances were not built after the crisis erupted. The East-West oil pipeline is perhaps one of clearest examples of this: this decades-old project, with the development its capacity has undergone, has become one of the most important strategic alternatives for exporting oil via Red Sea ports amid navigational disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. From an economic standpoint, the true value of this investment goes beyond its construction and operating costs and its direct returns; its importance emerges when traditional routes are disrupted, transport and insurance costs rise, and the ability to meet export commitments becomes a factor affecting revenue stability and the confidence of trading partners. Although the pipeline itself has been targeted during the crisis, its existence has given the Kingdom options that helped mitigate export disruptions. This is where the value of long-term strategic planning shows: the full economic importance of some assets only becomes clear when alternatives become limited.

This logic extends to the defense and industrial capabilities and international partnerships that the Kingdom worked to develop before the crisis and continued to strengthen during it. The recent events have tested investments in military industries and defense research and development, alongside strategic agreements with numerous countries. The crisis has also witnessed an expansion of defense and technical cooperation, and regional arrangements including the Makkah mutual defense agreement, in parallel with various tracks of cooperation and coordination with countries such as Egypt, Britain, and Ukraine, in line with the nature of existing relations and commitments with each. What deserves attention in these moves is the security and technical options they provide, and the opportunities they may create for joint manufacturing, knowledge transfer, and the development of national capabilities. Economic security is linked to a state's ability to protect its facilities, trade corridors, and investments, while the development of defense industries and technologies may open productive and knowledge domains that go beyond immediate military needs.

Among the aspects I consider extremely important in the Kingdom's management of the current crisis is its adoption of an approach based on self-restraint, weighing consequences, and avoiding rash escalation, while retaining its right to defend its security, sovereignty, and interests. From a strategic leadership perspective, self-restraint does not reflect hesitation or weakness in decision-making, but rather the ability to assess outcomes and choose the right timing and tool. Not every threat warrants widening the scope of confrontation, especially when the repercussions of escalation extend to energy, trade, and investment markets and the region's stability. I believe that combining readiness, firmness, and wisdom in managing the situation represents one of the most important elements of strategic power; a successful decision is not measured by the speed with which it is taken alone, but by its ability to achieve the interest without imposing on the state and the economy costs that could have been avoided.

Small details are no less important than major strategic decisions. Attention to seemingly simple matters—such as improving alert tones and distinguishing between danger and all-clear notifications, using sounds closer to those of familiar notifications—reflects the importance of clear communication with society and consideration for people's psychological state during exceptional circumstances. A warning must arrive with the clarity needed to achieve the required response, while an all-clear notice should be distinctive enough to prevent confusion or unwarranted continued anxiety. From a management standpoint, I see these details as reflecting an understanding of the nature of the relationship between institutions and society: a sense of safety, trust, and clarity of information are factors that affect the continuity of daily life, business activity, and economic behavior. Sometimes small operational details reveal the quality of management as much as major decisions do.

When I compare this scene with what happened during the coronavirus pandemic, I find that the link between the two experiences is not the similarity of the crises' nature, but the way capabilities built before each were leveraged. During the pandemic, the value of prior investments in digital infrastructure, financial institutions, and government services became evident, and support programs and institutional coordination helped mitigate the pandemic's effects. One need only look at the Tawakkalna experience—a platform that began to meet needs imposed by exceptional circumstances, then evolved into a comprehensive national platform offering multiple services to citizens, residents, and visitors. What is striking about this experience is that the solution imposed by the crisis did not end with it, but became an institutional asset that could be developed and leveraged in broader fields. The current crisis, by contrast, has highlighted the importance of a different set of capabilities, related to energy, defense, international partnerships, civil preparedness, and the continuity of economic activity. If the pandemic contributed to accelerating digital transformation and the development of service delivery models, I expect the current crisis to open the way for broader transformations in strategic industries, economic policies, and the nature of international partnerships, especially in the fields of manufacturing, technology, and supply security.

Here I believe the most important economic opportunity for the Kingdom may lie in turning what it has proven of its capacity for continuity and risk management into an additional element of its investment appeal. When an international company decides to establish a factory, a logistics hub, or a long-term partnership, it looks not only at operating costs, incentives, and expected returns, but also factors in the reliability of energy and supply, the stability of institutions, and the economy's ability to cope with disruptions. These considerations can affect risk and financing costs and the very decision to locate the investment in the first place. From this standpoint, the strategic structure, international relations, and institutional capabilities the Kingdom has built can add to its economic standing an advantage that goes beyond protecting existing activity—provided these foundations are translated into tangible productive, industrial, and investment opportunities. The economic value of readiness does not end with the losses we managed to avoid during the crisis, but extends to the investments, relationships, and opportunities that such readiness can attract afterward.

This logic does not apply to states alone; I see it as among the most important principles that should govern the decisions of corporate boards and executive leaderships. A company that invests in diversifying its income and supply sources, maintains financial flexibility, and builds strong relationships with its customers and financiers may, during periods of stability, bear costs that a competitor chasing maximum current profits by any means does not. But when a crisis strikes, the equation changes: the company that can keep operating and meet its obligations becomes more reliable, and may find opportunities for expansion, acquisition, or new contracts while others are busy dealing with distress. This does not mean that spending on readiness is justified without limit, but rather that capital allocation decisions must take into account the cost of risk and the value of available alternatives, alongside profitability and expected returns. The ultimate goal is not to build an institution that can survive a single crisis, but to build a business model that retains its ability to compete and grow whatever the circumstances.

That is why my optimism about the future of the Saudi economy is not based merely on an expectation that the crisis will end and growth rates will recover, but on the transformation this experience can leave in the Kingdom's economic standing and its ability to attract investments and develop its industries and partnerships. But I see the broader lesson, whether at the level of the state or the company, lying in revisiting the very concept of managerial success. A management that achieves the highest returns under stable conditions may not be the best if those returns came at the expense of its ability to endure when conditions change, just as success in overcoming a crisis is not complete if the institution returns afterward to the same weaknesses. This is perhaps the economic and managerial meaning we draw from the stewardship of Prophet Yusuf (peace be upon him): managing prosperity well was preparation for hardship, and preserving the capacity to produce until relief comes. Hardship does not become an advantage merely by subsiding, but when the decisions that protected the state or institution during it become the foundation for greater economic power and competitiveness afterward.

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Originally published in Arabic on Ksawats — 18 November 2026. Read the original in Arabic.